(一) 中共處理張又俠案不尋常之處
官方對張又俠落馬消息反應極快：外界甫於20日傳出張又俠劉振立等可能遭拘消息，中共國防部便於24日發布消息證實對張又俠劉振立涉嫌違紀違法立案審查，這與處理其它將領落馬模式不同。
中共國防部聲明「經黨中央研究，決定對張又俠劉振立立案審查調查」：顯示拘捕張又俠是習近平親自拍板決定。
中共發布張又俠落馬消息隔(25)日，解放軍報便刊出社論「堅決打贏軍隊反腐敗鬥爭攻堅戰持久戰總體戰」，嚴詞批判張又俠。中共所有官媒包括人民日報、新華社、求是網、中國網等中央直屬媒體以及各地方媒體如文匯報、大公報等，都同步聯合刊登解放軍報這篇社論：顯示習近平擔憂拘捕張又俠會造成軍隊內外強烈反彈，故藉由官媒統一刊載社論定調此事，加強輿論控制。
解放軍報社論批判張又俠罪名包括：「嚴重辜負黨中央、中央軍委信任重托，嚴重踐踏破壞軍委主席負責制，嚴重助長影響黨對軍隊絕對領導、危害黨的執政根基的政治和腐敗問題，嚴重影響軍委班子形象威信，嚴重衝擊全軍官兵團結奮進的政治思想基礎」：顯示張又俠落馬主因是政治問題而非貪腐問題。依據中共用語模式，上述語詞可解讀為「張又俠在軍中的威望嚴重挑戰習近平的領導威信，嚴重影響習近平對軍隊的絕對掌握，嚴重威脅習近平的權力基礎。」
(二) 後續可能發展
由上列中共中央各項不尋常舉動可知，習近平查辦張又俠，軍中必有強烈不滿聲音，尤其作戰系統幹部。此不滿情緒若無壓制，可能很快浮上檯面讓軍心更加燥動。
作戰、政工等系統可能將不滿指向近年來習近平獨厚之軍紀委系統，共軍內部不同系統之間的對立鬥爭可能加劇。
中共國防部聲明查辦張又俠是黨中央研究決定，可見此事乃習近平親自拍板，顯示查辦張又俠確實茲事體大，無人可承擔此責任，必須由習親自表態。而中共官媒聯合刊載解放軍報社論，也顯示習近平擔憂此事後續效應，必須快速緊縮掌握輿論風向，壓制軍內外之不滿聲浪。
不滿情緒主要有兩方面：一是軍隊內部，二是中共紅色家族。倘若此二不滿情緒短期內無法壓制，習近平權力可能遭受挑戰，明年中共21大能否繼續掌握權力，就存在變數。
短期內共軍機艦仍會依年度訓練計畫持續台海周邊戰備警巡等活動，但在無足以服眾望的將領在中央軍委會發揮謀定而後動的影響力之下，需慎防中共中央因軍隊內外對習近平權力挑戰日增，而對台採取軍事冒進行動。
(I) Unusual Aspects of the CCP’s Handling of the Zhang Youxia Case
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) handling of the case involving Zhang Youxia has been highly unusual in several respects.
First, the official response was remarkably swift. Shortly after rumors circulated on the 20th that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had been detained, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced on the 24th that both were under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.” This rapid confirmation contrasts sharply with the CCP’s typical approach to fallen senior officers, which usually involves prolonged silence before any formal acknowledgment.
Second, the wording of the Ministry of National Defense’s statement—“following deliberation by the Party Central Committee, a decision has been made to place Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under investigation”—strongly suggests that the move was personally approved by Xi Jinping. In the CCP’s political lexicon, such phrasing signals direct involvement by the top leader, underscoring the political sensitivity of the case.
Third, on the day following the announcement, the PLA’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, published a sharply worded editorial titled “Resolutely Winning the Protracted and All-Out Battle Against Military Corruption.” The editorial harshly criticized Zhang Youxia and was simultaneously reprinted across all major central and local Party-state media outlets, including People’s Daily, Xinhua, Qiushi, and regional papers such as Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao.
This unusually coordinated media campaign suggests that Xi Jinping was concerned the detention of Zhang Youxia could trigger significant backlash within the military or broader elite circles. By imposing a unified narrative through the Party’s propaganda apparatus, the leadership sought to preempt dissent and tighten control over public and internal discourse.
Finally, the substance of the accusations leveled against Zhang Youxia is notable. Rather than emphasizing personal corruption alone, the PLA Daily editorial accused him of “seriously betraying the trust of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission,” “undermining the CMC chairman responsibility system,” and “damaging the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and the political foundations of the CCP’s rule.”
In CCP discourse, such language points to political disloyalty rather than routine graft. Read in context, these charges imply that Zhang Youxia’s stature and influence within the military were perceived as challenging Xi Jinping’s authority and control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), thereby posing a threat to Xi’s personal power base.
(II) Possible Future Developments
Taken together, these unusual actions suggest that Xi Jinping’s decision to move against Zhang Youxia has generated substantial discontent within the PLA, particularly among officers in the operational command system. If left uncontained, such dissatisfaction could quickly surface and further unsettle military morale.
Disgruntlement within operational and political work systems may increasingly be directed at the military discipline inspection apparatus, which has been heavily empowered under Xi in recent years. As a result, factional tensions between different institutional systems within the PLA could intensify.
The Ministry of National Defense’s emphasis that the investigation was a Party Central Committee decision underscores that Xi Jinping personally assumed responsibility for the move, reflecting the gravity of the case and the absence of any alternative political cover. Likewise, the synchronized republication of the PLA Daily editorial indicates concern over potential second-order effects, prompting rapid efforts to dominate the narrative and suppress dissent both inside and outside the military.
Sources of dissatisfaction are likely to emerge from two main groups: within the military itself and among elite “red families” connected to the revolutionary generation. If these grievances cannot be contained in the short term, Xi Jinping’s authority could face increased strain, raising uncertainty over his ability to consolidate power at the upcoming 21st Party Congress.
In the near term, PLA aircraft and naval vessels are likely to continue routine operations around Taiwan in accordance with annual training plans. However, in the absence of a senior commander capable of commanding broad respect and exercising strategic restraint within the Central Military Commission, there is an elevated risk that growing internal challenges to Xi’s authority could incentivize the CCP leadership to adopt more adventurous military actions toward Taiwan.